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735 
FROM PRESERVATIVE TO TRANSFORMATIVE: 
SQUARING SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS WITH 
LIBERTY AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
 ―[T]rue individual freedom cannot exist without economic 
security and independence. . . . We have accepted . . . a second Bill 
of Rights . . . . The right to a useful and remunerative job . . . The 
right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and 
recreation . . . The right to adequate medical care . . . .‖1 
—Franklin Roosevelt, 1944 
 ―[T]hrough more and more rules and regulations and 
confiscatory taxes, the government was taking more of our money, 
more of our options, and more of our freedom.‖2  
—Ronald Reagan, 1989  
 ―[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative liberties . . . . [I]t 
doesn‘t say what the federal government or the state government 
must do on your behalf. . . . I‘m not optimistic about bringing about 
major redistributive change through the courts. The institution just 
isn‘t structured that way.‖3  
—Barack Obama, 2001 
The U.S. Constitution is not designed to create legally enforceable 
socioeconomic rights. Despite growing consensus about the normative 
importance of judicial consideration of socioeconomic deprivation,
4
 in 200 
 
 
 1. President Franklin Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 
1944). 
 2. President Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 11, 1989). 
 3. Radio interview by WBEZ-FM with U.S. Senator Barack Obama, in Chicago, Ill. (Jan. 18, 
2001).  
4. Contemporary conceptions track this view in the U.S. and abroad. See, e.g., Minister of 
Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1022 (CC) at para. 36 (S. Afr.) (―The state is 
obliged to take reasonable measures progressively to eliminate or reduce the large areas of severe 
deprivation that afflict our society. The courts[‘s] . . . function in respect of socioeconomic rights is 
directed towards ensuring that legislative and other measures taken by the State are reasonable.‖); 
President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Retirement of Supreme Court Justice David Souter (May 1, 
2009) (describing the desired attributes of a Supreme Court nominee as the ―quality of empathy, of 
understanding and identifying with people‘s hopes and struggles‖ and the understanding that ―[justice] 
is also about . . . whether [people] can make a living and care for their families.‖).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
736 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:735 
 
 
 
 
years of expounding the Supreme Court has never recognized 
socioeconomic rights as constitutional rights. Theories abound for this 
continued quiescence.
5
 Accepted reasons include lack of explicit textual 
support,
6
 well-embedded conceptions of ―negative‖ liberty, problems of 
justiciability, concerns about separation of powers, and difficulties with 
majoritarian approval. Yet, in the context of growing disparities in wealth
7
 
and the perceived consequences of legislative failure to address 
inequality,
8
 jurists (and political philosophers) increasingly view the 
recognition of socioeconomic rights as both a practical necessity and 
moral imperative.
9
 
This Note addresses the recognition of socioeconomic rights by U.S. 
federal courts.
10
 In this context, ―socioeconomic rights‖ means 
 
 
5. Whether this is failure, inability, or reluctance on the part of the Court depends on the 
constitutional principles with which one begins. For a political explanation, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR‘S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN 
EVER 105–08 (2004) (arguing that changes to the composition of the Supreme Court beginning in the 
late 1960s—notably President Nixon‘s four appointees—foreclosed the emerging possibility that the 
Court would recognize the constitutional status of social and economic rights); cf. R. Shep Melnick, 
The Price of Rights, IV CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS 26, 27 (2004) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR‘S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 
(2004)) (calling Sunstein‘s theory ―politically convenient‖ and wondering why he does not mention 
that two important liberal justices, Black and Warren, also failed to ―join the welfare rights 
bandwagon.‖). For an explanation based on conceptual difficulties rooted in the dominant scholarship 
of the time, see Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 
779, 780 (2004) (arguing that methodological assumptions arising from legal process theory obscured 
the possibility of using judicial means to enforce social welfare rights). 
 6. The Constitution, of course, has not been amended to include socioeconomic rights. It is 
possible to adduce why this is the case under discrete analysis. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, The New 
Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001) (arguing that the Civil Rights Movement 
redirected political attention from progress toward constitutional inclusion of socioeconomic rights 
that began in the 1930s). This Note does not take such an approach. See infra note 10.  
7. In the United States from 1997 to 2001, the top one percent captured far more of the real 
national gain in wage and salary income than did the bottom fifty percent. Clive Crook, The Height of 
Inequality, ATL. MONTHLY, Sept. 2006, at 36, 37. This trend continues. See generally Timothy Noah, 
The Great Divergence: What‟s Causing America‟s Growing Income Inequality?, SLATE, Sept. 3, 2010, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2266025/entry/2266026/.  
 8. See, e.g., Robert Reich, Unjust Spoils, NATION, July 19, 2010, at 13 (arguing that income 
inequality caused the 2008 U.S. recession).  
 9. E.g., THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY & HUMAN RIGHTS 97–107 (2d ed. 2008); Antonio 
Carlos Pereira-Menaut, Against Positive Rights, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 359, 365 (1988) (―[S]ocial and 
economic rights are intended precisely to remedy these deep causes of inequality, uncared for by the 
classical negative rights and liberties.‖).  
 10. This Note does not address legislative attempts to entrench socioeconomic rights in state law 
or attempts to do so by state courts. For an argument in favor of this approach, see Helen Hershkoff, 
Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
1132 (1999) (arguing that because state judges frequently are elected, implementation of 
socioeconomic rights in state constitutions is less problematic than at the national level). 
Commentators generally agree that, in the present environment, it is unworkable to amend the U.S. 
Constitution to include socioeconomic rights. See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss3/5
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―subsistence rights.‖ The former may refer to a broader set of rights, like 
the right to equally accessible higher education.
11
 The latter is more 
limited and refers to rights to the basic goods necessary to gain livelihood. 
Constitutional rights to subsistence, for example, may include the right to 
adequate food and water, the right to shelter, or the right to ―survival 
income.‖12 This Note considers the context in which these rights arise, 
what they are intended to address, and how their justification and 
implementation differ from that of existing constitutional rights.
13
 Though 
 
 
Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT‘L J. CONST. 
L. 391, 407–08 (2007) (arguing amendment is unworkable because of inherent procedural difficulty, 
notably Article V‘s demanding and inflexible two-thirds majority ratification requirement); Gregory 
Alexander, Why Are There No Socioeconomic Rights in the American Constitution? 24 (Sept. 20, 
2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study), available 
at http://academic.sun.ac.za/stias/projects/7_social_econ_justice/documents/abstracts/greg_alexander. 
pdf (arguing that amendment is unworkable because of the countermajoritarian problems associated 
with removing a right ―from the realm of ordinary politics‖). But see SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 179–
82 (contending that constitutional amendment is plausible if conceived and directed to address specific 
national problems).  
 11.  See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 13(2)(c), Jan. 
3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 12. See Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the 
Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1987) (defining constitutional obligation to assure ―survival‖ beyond the 
literal sense and as more generous than a bed in a homeless shelter and meals at a soup kitchen). In this 
sense, and for the purposes of this Note, the term socioeconomic rights is not meant to include 
―economic liberty‖ of the sort advocated by economic libertarians. That said, there was exceptional 
agreement among progressive liberals and classic libertarians that the Supreme Court should have 
revived the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, McDonald v. 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) [hereinafter Professors‘ Brief] (signed by Jack M. 
Balkin and Randy E. Barnett, among others). It stands to reason, of course, that Professors Balkin and 
Barnett harbored different hopes for the ultimate implications of a ruling in favor of the position they 
supported. For a discussion of the consequences of a renewed Privileges or Immunities Clause on 
socioeconomic rights, see infra Part IV.A and accompanying text. 
 13. Terminological disagreement exists on what constitutes a constitutional ―right.‖ Generally 
speaking, a right is a ―constitutionally recognized, judicially enforceable restraint on popular 
government.‖ Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 860 (2001). But 
the definition may also depend on the nature of its holder, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 91 (1978) (distinguishing political rights defined as individual political aims from 
nonindividuated political aims intended to produce some overall benefit), or on the context in which it 
is invoked, see Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 886 (1989) (defining constitutional rights as ―political abstractions‖ invoked ―to 
trump unacceptable democratic outcomes‖ when we ―suspect that democracy is not likely to operate 
with tolerable fairness‖). Rights may also be defined based on actions of a third party. See STEPHEN 
HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 17 (1999) 
(describing the transformation of an interest to a right ―when an effective legal system treats it as such 
by using collective resources to defend it‖). Lastly, the definition of a ―right‖ may depend on its 
perceived justiciability. Compare Pereira-Menaut, supra note 9, at 370 (―If a claim . . . cannot be 
defined and enforced in a court of law . . . then it is not a real right.‖), with Mark Tushnet, Social 
Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1898 (2004) (describing how 
a constitution can enumerate socioeconomic rights but exempt them from judicial enforcement).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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there is reason to believe that such rights lurk below the constitutional 
surface, that textual keys to unlock them exist, and that their recognition 
would be politically popular,
14
 federal courts remain unlikely venues for 
their constitutionalization.  
That said, a revitalization of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause,
15
 augured by its recent reexamination before the Court 
in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
16
 offers the most feasible analytic 
framework for judicial implementation of enforceable socioeconomic 
rights.
17
 
 
 
 14. Distinctive features of constitutional jurisprudence are relevant not only to the recognition of 
additional socioeconomic rights, but also to those seeking to exercise their existing rights in order to 
limit government expansion. See generally SETH LIPSKY, THE CITIZEN‘S CONSTITUTION: AN 
ANNOTATED GUIDE (2009) (annotating each clause of the Constitution, from the perspective of a 
nonlegal professional, as an exercise to inform ordinary citizens about constitutional limits to the 
enumerated powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government). 
 15. Following its demise in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause sat relatively dormant until 1999, when the Supreme Court invoked the ―right to 
travel‖ to invalidate a California law that limited new state residents to the lower level of welfare 
payments they had received in the state in which they previously resided. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 
489, 501–05 (1999). 
 16. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). In McDonald, the Court had a remarkable opportunity to revisit the 
Clause and its consequences. The question was whether the right to keep and bear arms is incorporated 
against the states through the Due Process Clause (as all incorporated Bill of Rights provisions have 
been) or through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In a five–four plurality opinion handed down in 
June 2010, the Court reached the expected result, albeit not through the (academically) preferred 
means. 
 17. Commentators within the same side of the political aisle were divided on the possible 
implications of the Court‘s ruling in McDonald. Progressive constitutionalists advocated a return to a 
―proper‖ understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment: a transformative, ―truly reconstructive‖ 
document, intended to spur government action to eliminate socioeconomic stratification. See, e.g., Jack 
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Remembering How to Do Equality, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 
93–95 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); see also Jess Bravin, Rethinking Original Intent, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2009, at W3 (quoting Akhil Reed Amar as stating that ―[t]he framers of the 14th 
Amendment were radical redistributionists‖). Economic libertarians also sought to overturn Slaughter-
House, perhaps as a means to attack the modern regulatory state. E.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Cato 
Institute and Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. 
Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). Some commentators foresaw a revival of the Clause, but limited 
ramifications thereof. E.g., Ilya Shapiro & Josh Blackman, Keeping Pandora‟s Box Sealed: Privileges 
or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms To 
The States, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 1 (2010) (arguing that though it is likely the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause will at some point be welcomed back into modern constitutional jurisprudence, it 
cannot be manipulated to constitutionalize modern, positive rights). Others feared the possibilities for 
which a reconfiguration might lay the groundwork. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Undoing Limited 
Government: Positive Rights Under the 14th Amendment?, FORBES, Mar. 31, 2009, http://www.forbes. 
com/2009/03/30/fourteenth-amendment-rights-opinions-columnists-government.html (warning that to 
overread the Fourteenth Amendment creates an open invitation for government expansion and that an 
improper revitalization of the Privileges or Immunities Clause may ―convert[] a charter of negative 
liberty into a source of positive rights‖). The implications of a ―reshaped‖ Privileges or Immunities 
Clause on judicial recognition of socioeconomic rights are discussed below. See infra Part IV.A. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss3/5
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Part I of this Note considers the conceptual distinction between positive 
and negative rights, and the first constitutional articulations of 
socioeconomic rights. Part II examines the perceived problems with 
socioeconomic rights‘ justiciability. Part III explains characteristics of the 
American constitutional framework that render it unreceptive to the 
recognition of socioeconomic rights. Finally, Part IV describes how a 
revived Privileges or Immunities Clause may lead to the recognition of 
socioeconomic rights. 
I. PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS 
A. Conceptual Distinction Between Positive and Negative Rights 
A ―negative‖ right restricts government interference. A ―positive‖ right 
compels government action. The distinction draws upon Isaiah Berlin‘s 
division of negative and positive liberty: the right to be left alone versus 
the right to self-determination.
18
 But this distinction operates generally.
19
 
Even the most fundamental negative rights have positive aspects: 
protection of private property, for example, requires state-funded police 
protection.
20
 Despite blurred theoretical differences between the two, and 
despite the difficulty in extracting utility in such distinctions from 
historical circumstances,
21
 rights can be classified with little intuitive 
difficulty as generally positive or generally negative.
22
 The U.S. 
 
 
 18. See Cross, supra note 13, at 863 (citing ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 
(1958)).  
 19. See, e.g., HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS 155 (2d ed. 1996) (―If one looks concretely at specific 
rights and the particular arrangements that it takes to defend or fulfill them, it always turns out in 
concrete cases to involve a mixed bag of actions and omissions.‖). 
 20. As another example, consider the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The language of the Clause expresses freedom from certain government actions. U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1 (protecting individuals against state law that would ―deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws‖). But as one important case shows, any right may compel positive 
government action. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (requiring state resource 
expenditure to desegregate ―separate but equal‖ educational facilities).  
 21. See infra note 34 for discussion of positive-negative distinctions as outgrowth of competing 
Cold War ideologies.  
 22. See HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 39 (conceding that, in practice, ―a distinction is 
routinely drawn between negative rights and positive rights‖). Yet, viewed from a sufficiently broad 
theoretical level, distinctions between rights converge in the nature of their enforcement. This truism 
echoes Jeremy Bentham and James Madison. See JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 206 (J.H. Burns, H.L.A. Hart & F. Rosen eds., 1996) 
(―Without law there is not property, and without property there is no law.‖); James Madison, Speech in 
the Virginia Constitutional Convention (Dec. 2, 1829), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS (Jack N. 
Rakove ed., 1999) (―The personal right to acquire property, which is a natural right, gives to property, 
when acquired, a right to protection, as a social right.‖).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Constitution—conventionally viewed—is a ―charter of negative rather 
than positive liberties.‖23 Moreover, because socioeconomic rights imply 
some duty to action on the part of the state and are expressed in terms of a 
right to some level of existence or goods, they are generally characterized 
as ―positive.‖24 
B. First Articulations of Socioeconomic Rights 
All constitutions are products of the political circumstances in which 
they are drafted.
25
 Social and economic rights first appeared in European 
constitutions in the early twentieth century.
26
 But the view that citizens 
may claim certain entitlements from their government was not new.
27
 Over 
the nineteenth century, changes in industrial conditions, social structures, 
and political values raised concerns that traditional rights and liberties 
 
 
 23. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Laurence H. Tribe, 
The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of 
Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 330 (1985) (―[R]ights tend to be individual, alienable, and 
negative. . . . [Rights] belong to persons as individuals. . . . [Rights] impose on government only a duty 
to refrain from certain injurious actions, rather than an affirmative obligation to direct energy or 
resources to meet another‘s needs.‖). Judge Posner‘s expression in Joliet, however, has been criticized 
for failing to take into account that many ―negative‖ constitutional provisions contain elements of 
―positive‖ rights. See, e.g., HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 43. But generally speaking, even 
advocates for judicial recognition of positive constitutional rights accept theoretical and practical 
distinctions between the two. See Cross, supra note 13, at 866; cf. Gerald C. MacCallum Jr., Negative 
and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312 (1967) (challenging the idea that distinctions between 
positive and negative rights can be made as an abstract, theoretical matter). 
 24. Pereira-Menaut, supra note 9, at 361; cf. David Robertson, Thick Constitutional Readings: 
When Classic Distinctions Are Irrelevant, 35 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 277, 278 (2007) (―Equating 
positive rights with socioeconomic rights is an oversimplification because the right to police protection 
. . . or the right to intervention by a welfare agency when one‘s father is a dangerous drunk are positive 
rights, but not in any simple sense socioeconomic.‖). For a discussion of the adjudication of a case 
factually similar to the latter, see infra note 64. 
 25. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1266 (1993) (describing 
words in a constitution as its drafters‘ ―language,‖ which embodies their ideals, hopes, prejudices, and 
enlightenments). The final content of a constitution also reflects some degree of compromise among 
competing interests, the composition of which is very likely to be different at the time of drafting than 
it would be today. See R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 687, 702 (2007) (―[M]any of those persons who were excluded from direct influence 
on the Founders‘ Constitution, or on the Civil War amendments, would have been sympathetic to some 
culturally appropriate minimal floor of economic provision as a matter of last resort.‖). 
 26. See, e.g., VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS art. 163 (Weimar Republic, 1919) (―Every 
German shall have the opportunity to earn his living by economic labor. So long as suitable 
employment can not be provided for him, his maintenance will be provided for.‖); CONSTITUCIÓN 
ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 344, Dec. 10, 1931, art. 9, ¶ 2, art. 30, ¶ 1(b),(c), arts. 30–53 (Spain). 
 27. See, e.g., David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
864, 867 (1986) (arguing that the state ―owed all citizens . . . nourishment, suitable clothing, and the 
opportunity for a healthy life‖) (quoting BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, ESPIRIT DES LOIS 2 (1898)). 
Indeed, by 1791, the French Constitution imposed a duty on government to ―furnish work to the able-
bodied poor who cannot obtain it for themselves.‖ Id. (citing 1791 CONST. tit. Ier. (Fr.)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss3/5
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offered inadequate protection against injustice and inequality.
28
 Mere 
absence of government restraint—freedom associated with civil and 
political liberties—was considered insufficient as a means for citizens to 
realize their own ends against government-supported structural 
impositions beyond their control.
29
 Positive government action was 
considered necessary to give substance to equality.
30
 As a result, nearly 
every constitution drafted after 1945 granted some constitutional status to 
socioeconomic rights.
31
  
The drafters of international resolutions have frequently created 
provisions that entrench socioeconomic rights. Indeed, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
32
 incorporated both socioeconomic 
and more traditional political and civil rights. The latter were thereafter 
moved to a separate document.
33
 This separation occurred largely as an 
outgrowth of the Cold War debate over human rights.
34
 The former, in 
 
 
 28. The classic, late-eighteenth-century liberal‘s overarching concern was disproportionate 
centralization of power. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 424–25 (Peter 
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (―The [r]eigns of good [p]rinces have been always 
most dangerous to the [l]iberties of their [p]eople.‖). By the end of the next century, concern shifted to 
the ―equal‖ opportunities to enjoy this liberty. See, e.g., ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE (THE RED 
LILY) ch. 7 (1894) (mocking the ―majestic equality of the law, which forbids the rich as well as the 
poor to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread‖), quoted in OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 340 (7th ed. 2009).  
 29. Such ―structural impositions‖ may take a variety of forms. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1336 (2d ed. 1988) (―[A]t least sometimes, the person who is 
forced to work too hard for too little, or can find no work at all, must be regarded as the victim of the 
system of contract and property rights rather than the author of his own plight.‖). 
 30. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY]; JOHN 
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 44 (2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, FAIRNESS] (―Fair equality of opportunity 
here means liberal equality. To accomplish its aims, certain requirements must be imposed on the basic 
structure beyond those of the system of natural liberty.‖); see also infra note 105 and accompanying 
text. 
 31. See, e.g., COST. (1947) (Ital.); CONST. OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC (1976). Some 
countries include socioeconomic rights as directive principles, rather than explicit guarantees. See, 
e.g., IR. CONST., 1937, art. 45. The Constitution of South Africa, adopted in 1996, is a useful model of 
a way to incorporate justiciable socioeconomic rights. This is largely thanks to the relatively rich body 
of case law from the country‘s Constitutional Court about how to interpret such rights. See infra notes 
47–48 and accompanying text (categorizing the intentionally ambiguous wording of the South African 
Constitution, which guarantees social and economic rights only ―within available resources‖).  
 32. G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 33. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 172 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. The ICCPR sets forth certain human rights principles (such as equal protection 
under law, freedom of thought, and liberty) and establishes a committee to monitor issues in the states 
that are parties to the ICCPR. Although the United States has ratified the Covenant, U.S. circuit courts 
have held that it does not create enforceable obligations because it was ratified with the understanding 
that it is not self-executing. See, e.g., Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 34. In a sense, the Soviet Bloc believed that economic and social rights were antecedent to civil 
and political freedoms (and could defend their human rights record by pointing to the positive 
rightsthat their system provides), whereas the United States believed that economic and social rights 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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turn, was also enunciated in a separate document—the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
35—which 
committed state parties to work toward granting economic, social, and 
cultural rights. Though signed by the United States, the Senate has never 
agreed to ratify it.
36
 This abstention, however, does not mean the U.S. is 
alone in leaving socioeconomic rights unrecognized.
37
 Even in countries 
bound as state parties to the ICESCR, the failure of such rights to gain 
traction reflects an important reality: absent effective means of 
enforcement and a basis in popular legitimacy,
38
 the enactment of 
socioeconomic rights remains futile.
39
  
 
 
came at the expense of individual freedom (and so could continue to privilege freedom of contract and 
protection of private property over notions of collective responsibility). See, e.g., MARY ANN 
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 17 (1991).  
 35. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 
(Dec. 16, 1966).  
 36. While the ICESCR is not legally binding, the Supreme Court is nonetheless bound to 
determine whether a particular practice has become customary international law or a general principle 
of law, even with respect to socioeconomic rights. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 
(2004) (―For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the 
law of nations.‖); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005) (citing ―overwhelming 
weight of international opinion‖ and noting that practices in other countries provide confirmation of 
the Court‘s conclusions); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (citing The International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and noting that the Court‘s 
decision was consistent with the international understanding of affirmative action). 
 37. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and Constitutional “Success,” 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 1339, 1361 (2009) (―Although theoretically the formal constitutional protection of positive social 
rights is supposed to advance their actual status, there appears to be no simple correlation between 
constitutional status and de facto protection of such rights.‖).  
 38. Opponents of transnational progressivism are keen to attack this point. See Ilya Shapiro, 
Presentation at Washington University in St. Louis School of Law (Nov. 17, 2009) (―[T]here are 
serious problems with giving the name ‗law‘ to institutions that are not rooted in any democratic 
legitimacy.‖). 
 39. See, e.g., Bas de Gaay Fortman, Laborious Law (Human Rights Working Papers, Paper No. 
15, 2001), available at http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/1999-2001/15-degayfortman-
09-01.pdf. Fortman distinguishes declared rights from those that are acquired through societal 
recognition and finds the former to have led to raised, unfulfilled expectations. Id. at 3. He calls for 
less focus on standard setting and greater emphasis on the local cultural, political, and economic 
context in which the rights will take shape. Id. at 7. Commentators call for a similar focus with respect 
to the implementation of socioeconomic rights in the U.S. See William E. Forbath, Social and 
Economic Rights: A Brief Guide to the Constitution of Work and Livelihoods, 11 J. LAB. & SOC‘Y, 
145, 154 (2008) (promoting ―[p]ublic debate, movement politics, and policy discourse‖ as the means 
to renew government‘s socioeconomic commitments). 
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C. Why Socioeconomic Rights Are Considered Important 
Drafters embed socioeconomic rights in constitutions for various 
reasons.
40
 Generally, modern constitutions are aspirational (or 
transformative); that is, declarative of an institutional value system that 
expresses the nation‘s ―deepest hopes and highest aspirations.‖41 In 
contrast, many older constitutions are preservative; that is, intended to 
maintain existing practices and ensure that society does not regress.
42
 The 
U.S. Constitution shares both aspirational and preservative 
characteristics.
43
 Articles I through VI provide the institutional structures 
governing the political community, while the First through Tenth and 
Thirteenth through Fifteenth Amendments
44
 provide individual rights 
thought necessary to protect the individual against intrusion via the 
government‘s power.45  
 
 
 40. See Mark Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1913. Tushnet points to the necessary accommodation in 
the constitutional drafting process of politically powerful social democratic parties, including those 
emphasizing social justice, as responsible for the inclusion of social welfare rights. Id. Though nearly 
all contemporary constitutions are ratified by popular referenda, the final version of the South African 
Constitution was reviewed by the newly created Constitutional Court. See Richard J. Goldstone, A 
South African Perspective on Social and Economic Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 4 (2006). For a 
discussion of the implications of this arrangement on the justiciability of socioeconomic rights, see 
infra note 67.  
 41. Robertson, supra note 24, at 279 (distinguishing ―value-impregnated document[s] 
representing a society‘s core values‖ from documents primarily concerned with ―formal delineation of 
authority and power relationships‖).  
 42. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 216–17. ―Preservative‖ constitutions are further described as 
―macro tables of organization‖ with ―discrete and freestanding prohibitions of certain government 
activities.‖ Robertson, supra note 24, at 279. All constitutions—modern, ancient, transformative, or 
preservative—also create basic political structures. 
 43. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM 261 (1985) (―In the truest sense of 
the terms, the reformation of the Constitution was simultaneously a conservative and a radical act.‖); 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 217 (describing the Due Process Clause as intended to ensure 
noninterference with rights long understood in Anglo-American traditions, in contrast with the 
forward-looking Equal Protection Clause intended to prevent future discrimination). Put differently, 
the Framers were preeminently concerned with the special role of the checks-and-balances system in 
ensuring deliberative democracy, see Cass Sunstein, The Enlarged Republic—Then and Now, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS, Mar. 26, 2009, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22453, but left room for 
the Court to interpret certain constitutional language as intended to preserve ―core values.‖ See, e.g., 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970) (using a finding that ―the Nation‘s basic commitment 
has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders‖ to suggest that welfare 
entitlements be regarded as property).  
 44. For specific discussion of the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was itself a 
transformative document, see infra notes 115, 116 and accompanying text.  
 45. That is not to say that such rights were necessarily thought to be necessary. Although the 
Framers saw federalism as an effective means to keep overzealous government at bay, by ―split[ting] 
the atom of sovereignty‖ in such a way they also created (perhaps unwittingly) a political structure 
particularly conducive to the efficient operation (and expansion) of government. U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Moreover, it may be argued that 
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Modern constitutions often share an additional characteristic: justice 
seeking. This principle directs legislators to work to establish justice and 
orients judicial interpretation toward the same.
46
 For example, in South 
Africa—where legally enforceable socioeconomic rights are explicit in the 
constitution—rights jurisprudence is based on the concept of human 
dignity.
47
 In this sense, a socioeconomic right may be ―empowering in that 
it affirms the inherent dignity of rights-bearers and awards political 
legitimacy to their demands for the satisfaction of their, otherwise 
overlooked, material needs.‖48 
The legitimacy of all constitutions, regardless of their founding 
principles, depends on the proper calculus of rules and principles 
respecting the individual with a political structure that maximizes 
democratic principles.
49
 Modern constitutions ground socioeconomic 
rights in the fundamental values their framers express. The relative 
importance assigned to such rights—and the role they play within a 
particular constitutional design—depends on the context in which such 
 
 
the Bill of Rights itself was meant to privilege popular majorities. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, at xii (1998) (―The genius of the Bill was not to downplay organizational structure but 
to deploy it, not to impede popular majorities but to empower them.‖). 
 46. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of 
Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410 (1993) [hereinafter Sager, Plain Clothes]. Sager advocates 
understanding the Constitution to include ―some normative premises, albeit judicially unenforceable, 
that are categorical, non-negotiable, and demanding of priority.‖ Lawrence G. Sager, Thin 
Constitutions and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1989, 1995 (2001) [hereinafter Sager, Good 
Society]. 
 47. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 1(a). The inclusive list of founding values is ―human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.‖ Id. The second 
aspiration, to achieve equality, is of particular importance in a country like South Africa, where an 
extraordinary degree of measurable inequality persists. See, e.g., U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL 
[ECOSOC], U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2009, tbl.m, 195–98 
(2009), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf. The Gini index 
quantifies income distribution on a scale of zero to 100, from absolute equality to absolute inequality. 
Id. at 210. Despite its modern infrastructure and the world‘s seventeenth-largest stock exchange, South 
Africa‘s Gini value of 57.8 ranks its distribution of income among the most unequal in the world. Id. at 
195–98; see also U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2008, at 598–
99 (2008); Simon Mundy, S. African Strikers Set to Defy Court Order, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/385a8e84-ae11-11df-bb55-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rsss 
(―[Public sector trade] unions argue that above-inflation [wage and housing allowance] increases are 
vital to tackling income inequality.‖); Bess Nkabinde, The Right to Strike, an Essential Component of 
Workplace Democracy: Its Scope and Global Economy, 24 MD. J. INT‘L L. 270 (2009). 
 48. Marius Pieterse, Eating Socioeconomic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights Talk in Alleviating 
Social Hardship Revisited, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 796, 797 (2007). Pieterse cautions, however, that ―the 
transformative potential of rights is significantly thwarted by the fact that they are typically 
formulated, interpreted, and enforced by institutions that are embedded in the political, social, and 
economic status quo.‖ Id.  
 49. See, e.g., James Tully, The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of 
Constitutional Democracy, 65 MOD. L. REV. 204, 205–06 (2002) [hereinafter Tully, Unfreedom]. 
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rights arise. Furthermore, the inclusion of such rights need not be morally 
based.
50
 Socioeconomic rights may also be entrenched and invoked to give 
substance to ―formal‖ notions of equality,51 remedy past discrimination, 
facilitate the exercise of other rights,
52
 redistribute wealth,
53
 grant greater 
access to the political process,
54
 or correct imbalances in power propagated 
by the existing (and government-supported) regime of contract and 
property rights. These justifications raise two questions relevant to their 
future in the United States: (1) As a general matter, of what value is 
constitutional (and not legislatively driven) recognition of socioeconomic 
rights, particularly in the face of considerable institutional difficulty? (2) 
What are the contextual circumstances in America that socioeconomic 
rights would be called to address? The first question implicates antecedent 
concerns of whether socioeconomic rights are even justiciable. I will thus 
address justiciability before turning to each question specifically. 
II. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION THROUGH THE COURTS  
A. Problems of Justiciability 
There are compelling arguments that courts should not be involved in 
the business of recognizing, adjudicating, or creating socioeconomic rights 
in the first place.
55
 Judicial restraint is generally defended for two reasons: 
 
 
 50. Though normative views of morality may be found in association with nearly all individual 
rights, a moral claim alone cannot sustain the existence of a right, socioeconomic or otherwise. See 
infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 51. See infra Part III.B. 
 52. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 53. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 54. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 55. Extensive debate exists on this topic and more generally on the proper role of an independent 
judiciary in a constitutional democracy. This Note does not address the appropriateness or the 
inappropriateness of judicial review of socioeconomic rights. Some scholars caution against judicial 
review of any rights, fundamental or otherwise. E.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against 
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (arguing that, in the face of inevitable disagreement about 
fundamental rights, decisions regarding their content and existence are best left to majoritarian 
institutions). This may be a self-fulfilling prophecy in that the very perception of nonjusticiability can 
prevent the normative development of socioeconomic rights that would otherwise occur through 
adjudication. See, e.g., David Marcus, The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights Through 
Supranational Adjudication, 42 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 53, 55 (2006) (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Rule of 
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1989)) (―[I]t ‗is indeed the essence of the 
judicial craft‘ to give ‗some precise, principled content‘ to ‗even the most vague and general text.‘‖). 
Nevertheless, judicial enforceability in many ways remains the sine qua non for a right to reach 
constitutional status. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 10, at 24 (blaming perceived legal 
unenforceability for Congress‘s failure to adopt the Equal Rights Amendment and actual legal 
unenforceability for Congress‘s repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment). As Alexander succinctly puts 
it: ―[a] statute that doesn‘t do something is tolerable; a comparable constitutional right is not.‖ Id. 
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skepticism about the existence of moral rights, and deference to 
democratic political institutions.
56
 This tracks the argument against 
judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights: in adjudicating rights, 
courts displace legislative judgment on social policy and make decisions 
with large budget obligations.
57
 Such displacement may put the court into 
―an impossible managerial position.‖58 Put generally, the fundamental 
concern is over proper separation of powers. It offends notions of 
democratic representation for a handful of individuals to measure citizens‘ 
normative values as a means to adjudge that for which others must pay.
59
  
Even if courts were tasked with enforcement of socioeconomic rights, 
the possibility that they lack the institutional capacity
60
 necessary to do the 
job remains a concern. One practical difficulty is that individual 
complainants are unsuited to argue an alleged deprivation of rights as the 
result of some larger social problem.
61
 This difficulty is compounded by 
the fact that society‘s most disadvantaged and marginalized—those likely 
to have the strongest claims—lack the ability and resources to get inside 
the courthouse in the first place.
62
 Furthermore, it is difficult for a court to 
 
 
 56. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 137–38. The skeptical theory holds that individuals 
hold only legal rights (and not moral rights) granted by the Constitution. Id. at 138. The theory of 
judicial deference, on the other hand, recognizes moral rights but holds the executive and legislative 
branches better suited to give content to such rights. Id. The latter theory resembles what is often 
called ―weak-form judicial review.‖ See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 57. Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1896–97.  
 58. Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa, 11 CONST. F. 
123, 126 (2001) (noting, as an example, that a state providing insufficient help to those who need 
housing may be doing so because it has chosen to concentrate on public health or some other social 
welfare program). Sunstein warns that a court‘s displacement of legislative judgment on social policy 
may ―discredit the constitutional enterprise as a whole.‖ Id.  
 59. Countermajoritarian concerns are closely related to those about separation of powers, and 
both are subjects of voluminous commentary. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986). For discussion 
of the unsuitability of the moral existence of basic rights depending solely on majoritarian approval, 
see infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. See also infra Part III.A. 
 60. Institutional capacity means the ability to gather the relevant information, make appropriate 
value judgments, and decide the substance of each right. Sunstein, supra note 58, at 126. Of course, 
enforcement of civil and political rights entails a very similar process. The only difference would seem 
to lie in the inherent nature of the right in question. Some argue that the enforcement of civil and 
political rights can itself implicate ―second-generation‖ rights. E.g., Jeanne M. Woods, Justiciable 
Social Rights as a Critique of the Liberal Paradigm, 38 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 763 (2003). It is worth noting 
that drafters of international charters of rights initially included civil and political rights within the 
same section as socioeconomic rights. For discussion of the political circumstances surrounding the 
eventual division into separate documents, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
 61. One commentator terms this the ―plaintiff problem.‖ Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-
Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321, 350–51 (2007) (recognizing the ―interrelated and reinforcing‖ concerns about 
the procedural limitations of judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights). 
 62. Ellen Wiles, Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio-Economic 
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efficiently address larger social problems when its only available remedy 
is directed to the specific context in which an individual complainant‘s 
grievance arose.
63
 
It is clear that obstacles exist to efficiently adjudicate socioeconomic 
claims in courts. It is also clear that deciding when and how to protect 
rights involves balancing normative and practical considerations to arrive 
at a decision that not only addresses the complainant‘s grievance, but also 
does so in accordance with constitutionally articulated principles.
64
 We 
 
 
Rights in National Law, 22 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 35, 56 (2006). Wiles notes, however, that ―[s]imilar 
criticisms . . . were leveled at civil and political rights before their jurisprudential development through 
practice and scholarship.‖ Id. at 53. That an individual complainant may be impoverished and 
unsophisticated does not foreclose the possibility that a court may find a broad, affirmative obligation 
on the part of government to provide a good or a service. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963) (holding that in state criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment requires the state to provide an 
attorney for defendants who cannot afford their own counsel). The complainant in the case, Clarence 
Earl Gideon, wrote his appeal in pencil and paper while in prison. James Taranto, Editorial, Our 
„Constitutional Moment,‟ WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2009, at A13. Though Gideon‘s success was in no 
small part due to the talent of his Court-appointed attorney (Abe Fortas, who joined the Court himself 
two years later), his case represents the possibility of ―[o]rdinary people asking simple questions‖ 
about the Constitution that can ―affect[] the country in enormous ways.‖ Id.  
 63. Christiansen terms this the ―remedy problem.‖ Christansen, supra note 61, at 349. But see 
Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1895–97 (cautioning against conflating all rights with remedies). A South 
African case involving the positive right to housing serves as an example of another type of ―plaintiff 
problem‖—one where the court‘s order provides no relief to the plaintiff who brought suit in the first 
place. In Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 
1209 (S. Afr.), the Constitutional Court found the government‘s housing development program 
constitutionally flawed because it failed to accommodate people who needed immediate, temporary 
shelter. The court ordered the implementation of adequate housing for those in ―desperate need,‖ but 
rejected any individual right to housing on demand. Id. at 1198. Eight years later, Irene Grootboom 
died, still waiting for her temporary shelter. See Pearlie Joubert, Grootboom Dies Homeless and 
Penniless, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Aug. 8, 2008, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-08-grootboom-
dies-homeless-and-penniless. 
 64. For an example of the complexity and difficulty associated with the Court‘s decision-making 
process in the context of determining the positive obligations of government to its citizens, see 
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that the Due 
Process Clause protects against state action only, and the state cannot be found liable for failure to 
protect an individual from a private actor). The facts of the case are particularly disturbing: Randy 
DeShaney repeatedly beat his son Joshua, to the point that the boy ―suffered brain damage so severe 
that he is expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution for the profoundly retarded.‖ 
Id. at 193. State social services were notified of the abuse, but did not remove Joshua from his father‘s 
custody. Id. As a legal matter, Chief Justice Rehnquist—though calling the circumstances ―undeniably 
tragic‖—emphasized the Framers‘ intent to leave state assurance of certain levels of minimum safety 
and security to democratic political processes. Id. at 191, 196 (―[The Due Process Clause‘s] purpose 
was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other.‖). 
Rehnquist dismissed the argument that, though the state had no part in creating the danger, it had a 
duty to provide adequate protective services arising from the ―special relationship‖ created by the 
circumstances of the case. Id. at 200 (―The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State‘s 
knowledge of the individual‘s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the 
limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.‖). The contention that the 
state owes a ―special,‖ affirmative duty to those whose predicament is a result of past government 
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assume, in a democratic society, that determinations about what rights are 
―fundamental‖ (thus requiring compelling government reasons to support 
abridgment) ought to be left to democratic political processes, which, in 
most cases, reflect the will of the majority.
65
 That said, a convincing 
argument can be made that the majority—aided by (1) structural 
impositions created and supported by the government, and (2) incomplete 
and occasionally arbitrary conceptions of the content of fundamental 
rights—cannot and will not make decisions necessary to substantively 
facilitate individuals‘ realization of their existing constitutional rights.66 In 
such situations, the only recourse of an individual who lacks political 
capital would seem to be in the courts.
67
 Rather than focus on existing 
structural limitations of the courts, it is useful to consider an alternative 
model of judicial review, or what Mark Tushnet refers to as ―weak-
form.‖68 After introducing this concept, I will show that, even if the 
 
 
action tracks a key argument for the judicial recognition of socioeconomic rights. See also Town of 
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 65. Currently, regular federal and state laws provide some measure of socioeconomic protection, 
particularly in the areas of education and health care. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 13, at 888. That 
citizens of each state should be free to decide what level of government-guaranteed subsistence is best 
coheres to a general belief in the benefits of federalism. As a normative concept, this appears both in 
the context of socioeconomic rights to advocates of a larger welfare state, see, e.g., id., and in the 
context of judicial determination of other nonexplicit constitutional rights, see, e.g., Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―One of the benefits of leaving regulation of 
this matter to the people rather than to the courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things 
to their logical conclusion.‖). 
 66. ―Structural impositions‖ can take a variety of forms. In the United States, one perceived 
barrier to an individual‘s full realization of his or her fundamental rights is the very conception of 
rights the Framers chose to adopt at America‘s founding. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 29, at 1336 
(―[A]t least sometimes, the person who is forced to work too hard for too little, or can find no work at 
all, must be regarded as the victim of the system of contract and property rights rather than the author 
of his own plight.‖). For a list of the most commonly perceived ―structural impositions,‖ see supra text 
accompanying notes 51–54. Such a list is not necessarily exhaustive. See Laurence H. Tribe, 
Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential 
Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1079 (1977) (recognizing ―an unarticulated perception 
that there exist constitutional norms establishing minimal entitlements to certain services‖). 
 67. One model is a forum that places ultimate decision making about fundamental rights in the 
hands of experienced judges in a specialized constitutional court. See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 40 
(describing how the South Africa Constitutional Court has enforced socioeconomic rights while 
balancing state legislative prerogatives). Goldstone served as a justice on the ―specialized‖ South 
Africa Constitutional Court. Id. at 4. The U.S. model—with the same Court as final arbiter of both 
regular and constitutional law—is the exception, rather than the rule, among constitutional 
democracies. 
 68. MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 23–25 (2008) [hereinafter TUSHNET, 
WEAK COURTS]. It is worth noting that, in an earlier work, Tushnet advocated removal of the entire 
Constitution from judicial powers of enforcement. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). For characterization of weak-form review in comparison to strong-
form review, see infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.  
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American constitutional framework shifted toward the weak-form model, 
it would still be inapt for judicial recognition of socioeconomic rights.  
B. Weak-Form Judicial Review and Majoritarian Rights 
Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court represent a form of strong 
judicial review.
69
 When the Court holds a statute unconstitutional, its order 
has immediate and potentially broad repercussions for public officials and 
private citizens alike. The Court‘s decision—reasonable, well-researched, 
and thoughtfully presented though it may be—can conflict with what a 
majority of people, in their own reasonable estimation, thinks that the 
result should be. According to Tushnet, the trouble lies in the (limited) 
available recourse, namely, to ―amend the Constitution, or wait for judges 
to retire or die.‖70 By contrast, weak-form judicial review provides a 
shorter way to respond to decisions reasonably believed to be mistaken.
71
 
Weak judicial review may take a variety of forms, but it is generally 
characterized as permitting the court to declare government action 
unconstitutional. In contrast to strong-form review, it allows officials to 
develop appropriate remedies over some short but unspecified period of 
time.
72
 Tushnet finds weak-form review superior to strong-form review for 
enforcing socioeconomic rights because it better captures reasonable 
disagreement about the contextual meaning of abstract rights and reduces 
the tension between courts and elected representatives.
73
 
Enforcing rights, of course, is not necessarily the same as recognizing 
them. A court generally cannot find government action unconstitutional 
 
 
 69. TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, supra note 68, at 22. Put succinctly, under strong judicial review, 
the judgment of the court may fully displace the judgment of the legislature. Tushnet, supra note 13, at 
1909. The U.S. Supreme Court has long asserted its interpretive supremacy, reflecting its commitment 
to strong-form judicial review. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528–29 (1997) (citing 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)) (reiterating that the legislature has no power 
to alter the Court‘s interpretation of the Constitution).  
 70. TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, supra note 68, at 22.  
 71. Id. at 23. Tushnet stresses the importance of the word ―reasonable‖ in his argument that the 
Court‘s interpretations produce internal dissent, which is sufficient to show that more than one 
―reasonable‖ outcome exists. Id. at 23–24. 
 72. Id. at 24. Of course, ordering delayed remedies is not entirely foreign to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering desegregation ―with all 
deliberate speed‖). Modern ―redemptive constitutionalists‖ see the greater willingness of American 
courts to order such remedies as an important doctrinal move in promoting equality. Balkin & Siegel, 
supra note 17, at 101–02 (calling for courts to ―explain the constitutional principles at stake,‖ ―state 
the parameters they will use in reviewing the remedy,‖ and describe ―what kinds of reasons and 
justifications the legislatures must provide‖).  
 73. TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, supra note 68, at 227–65. Of course, an overdelayed remedy may 
at times be as ineffective as no remedy at all. See supra note 63.  
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unless the grounds for doing so are in the Constitution. Before considering 
the implications of a theoretical reconceptualization of the U.S. process of 
judicial review as weak form, then, it is first helpful to consider the 
potential grounds for implementing socioeconomic rights based on the 
Constitution as is.  
Equal protection
74
 and due process claims rarely have persuaded 
federal judges to derive positive rights from the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court‘s sweeping rhetoric75 on socioeconomic issues has 
nonetheless resulted in narrow holdings.
76
 Several ideas exist to explain 
this, two of which are relevant here: the ―settler‘s society‖ account and the 
―thin Constitution‖ account. Both have broad appeal—though for different 
reasons—and both fall short of fully capturing why federal courts and 
legislatures have been unreceptive to socioeconomic rights. 
The first account is historical: the United States is a ―settlers‘ society,‖ 
and, as such, individual autonomy and possessive individualism, rather 
than social justice or appeals to collective responsibility, ―dominate[] legal 
and political thinking.‖77 The second is based on the notion of ―thin‖ 
constitutional case law. Socioeconomic rights are present in the text, but 
are chronically underenforced as a result of ingrained deference to the 
judgment of legislators.
78
 In essence, absent precedential vocabulary, the 
Court lacks the appropriate means to express and enforce certain rights.
79
 
Once the legislature has initiated action within a particular arena, however, 
 
 
 74. Generally speaking, under equal protection jurisprudence, similar treatment of individuals 
differently situated passes constitutional muster, whereas different treatment of individuals similarly 
situated warrants more careful evaluation. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (―[A]t least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require 
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.‖). 
 75. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (―Public assistance . . . is not mere charity, 
but a means to ‗promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity.‘‖). 
 76. See Neuborne, supra note 13, at 886–90 (cataloging various failed attempts to recognize 
positive rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
That is not say the Court has never derived affirmative government obligations from constitutional 
text. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For discussion of Gideon, see supra note 
62.  
 77. Fortman, supra note 39, at 7. 
 78. Sager, Good Society, supra note 46, at 1995. Sager first spelled out the idea of ―thin‖ 
constitutionalism as a means to explain why the body of case law on certain constitutional issues fell 
short of the range of political justice questions that could reasonably be implicated by the text. Sager, 
Plain Clothes, supra note 46, at 410 (distinguishing the adjudicated Constitution from the full 
Constitution). Sager advocates a secondary role for the judiciary in implementing socioeconomic 
rights, behind the legislature. 
 79. See Sager, Plain Clothes, supra note 46, at 410. 
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the Court is competent to issue orders and write opinions based on the 
right in question.
80
 
Both the ―settler‘s society‖ account and ―thin‖ constitutional theory 
account offer insight into the American constitutional framework. Under 
the latter, majoritarian approval alone suffices to justify the existence of a 
right. This is antithetical to the calculus of government envisaged by the 
Framers.
81
 Under the former, individual autonomy is a higher-order 
interest, but remains subject to reordering should new constructs come to 
dominate legal and political thinking (for example, social justice or 
appeals to collective responsibility). This not only ignores why a hierarchy 
of interests exists in the first place, but also relies on the assumption that 
societies evolve in but one direction—becoming more just, becoming 
more moral, or possessing greater truth.
82
 Subordinating the capacity to 
determine one‘s own conception of the good to the majority‘s ability to 
arrive at and impose a collective system of values subverts autonomy and 
ultimately renders society‘s novel moral constructs indefensible. One can‘t 
decide what‘s best for all when one lacks the ability to decide what‘s best 
for oneself. Even if the form of judicial review in the U.S. were ―weak,‖ it 
is no more legitimate for a court to decide when and where the legislative 
or executive branches have discretion to determine a socioeconomic 
right‘s content than it is for a court to do so itself. As such, successful 
justification for the judicial recognition of socioeconomic rights cannot be 
based exclusively on the consent of the governed to judicial or majority 
values. 
 
 
 80. Id.; see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 699 (6th ed. 2009) (noting 
that ―the cases in which the Supreme Court addressed wealth discrimination generally arose within the 
context of challenges to the denial of access to specific government programs‖). 
 81. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 358–59 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 
2002) (―It is of great importance in a republic . . . to guard one part of the society against the injustice 
of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be 
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.‖). 
 82. A quick glance at societal changes wrought by certain political groups in their respective 
countries over the twentieth century would seemingly suffice to disabuse one here, Dr. Pangloss 
notwithstanding. See generally RICHARD J. EVANS, THE COMING OF THE THIRD REICH (2003); KANAN 
MAKIYA, THE REPUBLIC OF FEAR: THE POLITICS OF MODERN IRAQ (1989) (originally published under 
the pseudonym Samir Al-Khalil).  
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III. MORALITY, LIBERTY, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
A. Insufficiency of Majoritarian Consent 
Two basic moral assumptions conflict when dealing with 
socioeconomic obligations on a large scale: the general recognition that we 
have certain general obligations to assist others, and the understanding that 
there are limits on what any other person can demand of us as a duty or 
obligation.
83
 But this does not mean that moral values may not be 
embodied in law
84
 or that there is not a strong moral case for helping those 
who are in need.
85
 The problem arises in the application of such a right. 
The very nature of a morally valid claim is that its recognition does not 
depend on persuading those who have the power to recognize the 
existence of the right.
86
 In other words, the question is whether, absent the 
existence of government, the right would still be fulfilled.
87
 
 
 
 83. DAVID BILCHITZ, POVERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE JUSTIFICATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS 104–05 (2007). Bilchitz argues that the justification for 
socioeconomic rights is fundamentally the same as that for civil and political rights. Id. at 57–65.  
 84. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157–58 (2007) ( ―ethical and moral concerns,‖ 
in the context of interest in fetal life, represent substantial state interests). 
 85. Influential conservatives are eager to express agreement on this point. See, e.g., Douglas W. 
Kmiec, Young Mr. Rehnquist‟s Theory of Moral Rights—Mostly Observed, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1827, 
1843 (2006) (quoting William Rehnquist: ―[T]he indignity and debasement of the human being who is 
simply unable to find a place for himself in the economic system is so great that it must be conceded 
that the right to work is a morally valid claim.‖); see also Edelman, supra note 12, at 24 n.93 (quoting 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 319 
(1985)) (arguing ―that government has very little power to help‖ those who are in need, though such a 
view ―‗does not imply . . . there is no moral case for helping‘‖); Edelman, supra note 12, at 23–24 
(quoting Antonin Scalia, Scalia Speaks, WASH. POST, June 22, 1986, at C2) (―The moral precepts of 
distributive justice . . . surely fall within the broad middle range of moral values that may be embodied 
in law but need not be. It is impossible to say . . . that our constitutional traditions mandate the legal 
imposition of even so basic a precept of distributive justice as providing food to the destitute.‖). 
Furthermore, some commentators do advocate for socioeconomic rights based on moral grounds. See, 
e.g., Barbara Stark, Theories of Poverty/The Poverty of Theory, 2009 BYU L. REV. 381, 398 
(contending that viewing socioeconomic rights ―as moral obligations rather than legal obligations, 
provides an independent basis for compliance and at the same time supports their underlying norms‖). 
 86. This calls to mind the distinction made between positive and negative rights. See supra notes 
18–24 and accompanying text. Traditional negative rights serve to limit the coercive power of the 
state, derived from the Kantian view of liberty based on autonomy. See Wiles, supra note 62, at 45.  
 87. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 13, at 866 (arguing that negative rights do not depend on 
government because, if government does not exist, it cannot ―establish a religion, pass a law denying 
free speech, or deprive its citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process‖). The same is not 
true for the ends that such rights are meant to achieve. See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Liberty Is Liberty, 
CATO UNBOUND (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/03/12/tom-g-palmer/liberty-is-
liberty/ (―Freedom is an inherently social concept, devoid of meaning outside of society . . . . Liberty, 
like generosity and kindness, refers to a relationship among persons . . . .‖). 
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Even if collective responsibility dominates legal and political thinking, 
and even if ―thick‖ constitutional case law exists, human nature prescribes 
that individuals will pursue their own goals and ―determine their own 
conceptions of the good.‖88 The fundamental purpose of a ―right,‖ then, 
remains the same—to facilitate one‘s individual pursuits. But this raises an 
important question: what, if any, are the necessary preconditions for the 
substantive exercise of rights aimed at achieving one‘s goals? On one 
hand, government may function as a regulator of private ordering; on the 
other, it can serve as a facilitator of private ordering.
89
 Ideally, we want to 
live in a society that facilitates human possibility, but does so without 
undue coercion. It is from balancing these two goals that the content of 
socioeconomic rights emerges. 
Balancing facilitation and regulation begins with defining the content 
of each role. Before deciding what exactly it means to ―facilitate human 
possibility,‖ we must first consider what it means to be ―free from 
coercion.‖ Traditionally, this has meant the absence of external, 
governmental restraint.
90
 Such a definition is neat, but incomplete. For 
one, it does not readily account for restraints that arise from cultural 
context.
91
 Even the strictest negative-rights adherent must accept that the 
definition of liberty he or she defends depends, to a certain extent, on 
social recognition.
92
 Assuming that the facilitation of human possibility 
 
 
 88. Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1902 
(2001). This is in accord with ―liberal commitments to individual autonomy.‖ Id. (citing MARTHA 
NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2000); Amartya Sen, Rights as Goals, in 
EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION: ESSAYS IN FREEDOM AND JUSTICE 14 (Stephen Guest & Alan Milne 
eds., 1985) (1985)). This conception is best termed one‘s summum bonum, ―[t]he greatest good,‖ 
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1447 (8th ed. 2004). The achievement of this depends, to varying degrees 
but rarely at the exclusion of the other, on our two familiar freedoms; from arbitrary interference 
imposed by others (so-called ―negative‖ freedom) and from limitations inherent in one‘s self. See 
supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 89. The conceptual division of rights emerges here. Government as facilitator tracks the negative 
conception of rights and stands for freedom from coercion; government as regulator tracks the positive 
conception of rights and signifies enabling human possibility. See Kmiec, supra note 85, at 1842 
(describing the two roles of government: (1) ―honor[ing] the avoidance of force, but creat[ing] little 
opportunity‖ and (2) ―magnify[ing] opportunity,‖ but ―increas[ing] the level of coercion on other 
citizens‖). 
 90. This is the classical, negative conception. See LOCKE, supra note 28.  
 91. See Kerry Howley et al., Are Property Rights Enough?, REASON (Oct. 20, 2009), 
http://reason.com/archives/2009/10/20/are-property-rights-enough (arguing, from a libertarian 
perspective, ―for a wider vision of human liberty . . . that acknowledges government is not the only 
threat to freedom‖).  
 92. See, e.g., id. (noting that ―[a]bsent friendly social forces, property rights are an impotent 
abstraction‖). 
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(via socioeconomic rights) at times requires coercion, in what situations 
are there adequate grounds to interfere with liberty?
93
 
The response turns on the conception of liberty with which one begins. 
The Declaration of Independence
94
 begins by stating an inalienable right to 
liberty (along with ―life‖ and the ―pursuit of happiness‖),95 but gives little 
guidance on how it is safeguarded or the circumstances where intrusion 
upon it is warranted. The only thing we can perhaps say with some 
certainty is that liberty is our most important constitutional value,
96
 and 
that the American conception of liberty may be (and, for historical 
reasons, likely is) different than that expressed in the founding documents 
of other nations.
97
 One relatively uncontroversial idea is that liberty 
 
 
 93. Once one tries to assign relative values to different liberties within a normative hierarchy, the 
complexity of this question emerges. See, e.g., RAWLS, FAIRNESS, supra note 30, at 44, 111 
(enumerating a list of equal basic liberties ―bound to conflict with one another‖ and subject to 
limitation ―only for the sake of [one another], and never for a greater public good‖). For a more direct 
take, compare William Saletan, What Reagan Got Wrong, SLATE, June 6, 2004, 
http://www.slate.msn.com/id/2101835 (―Sometimes, you need more government to get more liberty.‖), 
with President Ronald Reagan, supra note 2 (―There‘s a clear cause and effect here . . . : As 
government expands, liberty contracts.‖).  
 94. To be clear, neither the Declaration nor Articles of Confederation provide precedent or 
evince rigid truth. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm‘n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 791 (1982) 
(O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (―The principal defect of the Articles of Confederation, 18th-century writers 
agreed, was that the new National Government lacked the power to compel individual action. Instead, 
the central government had to rely upon the cooperation of state legislatures to achieve national 
goals.‖). 
 95. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). What the Declaration does 
express is that government exists for the benefit of the people and that ―all members of a society are 
entitled to full protection of the law and to the right to participate in public affairs.‖ AKHIL REED 
AMAR & LES ADAMS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS PRIMER 27 (2002). It is important to note that though the 
Declaration emphasizes liberty and equal opportunity to seek happiness, it contains no guarantee that 
members of society actually reach it. See infra notes 112–19 and accompanying text (making careful 
distinction between equal opportunities and equal outcomes). 
 96. See, e.g., Michael Anthony Lawrence, The Potentially Expansive Reach of McDonald v. 
Chicago: Enabling the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 139, 159–
60 n.66 (contending that because every constitutional amendment—except the Eighteenth, which was 
repealed by the Twenty-First—has had the effect of broadening liberty, ―the core value for which the 
people believe the Constitution stands is Liberty‖). This is not necessarily true of changes made to 
state constitutions. See James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2004, at P4 (reporting passage of constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage in 
each of the eleven states in which the issue appeared on the ballot). See generally Justice Antonin 
Scalia, Remarks at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Mar. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/current/guest_commentary/scalia-constitutional-speech.htm 
(―Some people are in favor of the Living Constitution because they think it always leads to greater 
freedom . . . [and] more and more rights. Why would you think that? It‘s a two-way street. And indeed, 
under the aegis of the Living Constitution, some freedoms have been taken away.‖). 
 97. For example, liberty in the Declaration is affirmed in conjunction with ―life‖ and the ―pursuit 
of happiness,‖ which has implications for its meaning very different than that of the liberty in the 
French Constitution, where it is pronounced alongside ―égalité‖ and ―fraternité‖ (―equality‖ and 
―fraternity.‖) 1958 CONST. pmbl. In English, equality means equity or fairness, and an equitable 
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depends on effective democracy.
98
 But even assuming that we can agree 
on this notion (and accept an insecure reliance on unelected judges to 
protect democratic values), it seems impossible to arrive at clear and 
consistent standards on how courts should interpret constitutional rights to 
apply to certain facts.
99
  
Generally speaking, interference with liberty is warranted where liberty 
itself is threatened.
100
 Such a threat may come from the socially 
destructive fact that many individuals lack basic choice in obtaining means 
of survival.
101
 The recognition of socioeconomic rights, then, might be 
justified on the continued subordination of persons who are unable to 
meaningfully exercise liberty.
102
 
B. U.S. Constitutional Framework: Contextual Circumstances Ripe for 
Review? 
Socioeconomic rights may be entrenched and invoked to give 
substance to ―formal‖ notions of equality. Formal equality contemplates 
only those situations where the law treats similarly situated individuals 
 
 
distribution usually involves some calculation of proportionate efforts. In French, égalité more closely 
means ―arithmetical uniformity.‖ Michael Novak, Social Justice: Not What You Think It Is, HERITAGE 
LECTURES, Dec. 29, 2009, at 2, available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/hl_ 
1138.pdf.  
 98. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 56–57 (2005). Justice Breyer calls for an 
elaborate cost-benefit analysis and sanctioning judicial intervention with liberty when believed to 
enhance democratic participation. See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) 
[hereinafter ELY, DISTRUST] (advocating for an interpretation of the Constitution that reinforces 
democratic processes and popular self-government through equal representation in the political 
process). One problem with the argument for socioeconomic rights based on democratic principles is 
that even with perfect political processes, a majority may still choose to limit the amount of assistance 
it provides to those most disadvantaged in society.  
 99. This, in a way, brings us back to the rather unfulfilling (and, to originalists, unpalatable) view 
that judicial outcomes depend first and foremost on the circumstances of the particular case. In other 
words, pragmatism takes precedent to ideology. See Obama: Aim for Fundamental Change, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, Oct. 3, 2008, http://www.freep.com/article/20081003/OPINION01/810030434/ (―[W]hen 
I think about the kinds of judges who are needed today . . . . [the desired judges] have to look at what 
is going on around [them] and not just ignore real life.‖); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text 
(illustrating growing agreement that courts should have some role in alleviating social hardship).  
 100. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The “Necessary” History of Property and Liberty, 6 CHAP. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (2003) (―[T]he bottom line is that the presumption of liberty can be overcome only in those 
cases of a socially destructive ‗prisoner‘s dilemma‘ game or a genuine externality.‖).  
 101. Id. Epstein does not believe, however, that market competition is itself an externality 
pernicious enough to warrant interference with individual liberty. Id.  
 102. As one commentator put it: ―[S]ocio-economic rights can therefore be considered 
‗component[s] of a commitment to individual freedom . . . .‘‖ Wiles, supra note 62, at 48 (quoting 
DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 113 (2d ed. 2002)); 
see also Balkin & Siegel, supra note 17, at 99 (―The practical reality of freedom matters as much as its 
formal possibility.‖).  
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differently.
103
 Similar treatment is not the same as equal treatment if the 
groups in question are not similarly situated. For example, treating 
everyone the same may be an effective strategy for disadvantaging certain 
groups when the differences between groups are relevant.
104
 Substantive 
equality may extend, then, to situations where the law treats differently 
situated people the same.
105
  
For descriptive purposes, notions of substantive equality seem more 
nebulous than those of formal equality. But both remain indistinct until we 
know what situations are similar and what differences are relevant.
106
 
Moreover, precisely what and how substance is to be (legally) applied 
depend on the conception of (political) justice with which one begins. As 
between the ideals of liberty and equality,
107
 it is generally understood that 
the great, albeit very rough, divide is between the conservative‘s political 
preference for liberty and the liberal‘s political preference for equality. 
Insofar as equality naturally tends toward a static condition of society, it is 
the more disruptive dynamic of liberty that tends to upend, rather than 
maintain, established order.
108
  
 
 
 103. Individuals are similarly situated in the sense that their rights and obligations do not vary 
with the identity of their holder; the uniform application of law is what makes a legal order objective. 
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (―[T]he concept of equal protection has been 
traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the 
governmental action questioned or challenged.‖).  
 104. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (―The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the difference between a ‗No 
Trespassing‘ sign and a welcome mat.‖); cf. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 86 
(1960) (―It is the essence of the demand for equality before the law that people should be treated alike 
in spite of the fact that they are different.‖). 
 105. In normative terms, justice might require treating unequal persons unequally. This depends 
not only on identifying the ―relevant‖ differences among rights holders, but also on an inquiry into the 
identity of the rights infringer. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1210 (2010) [hereinafter Rosenkranz, Subjects] (―Every constitutional inquiry 
should begin with a basic question that has been almost universally overlooked. The fundamental 
question, from which all else follows, is the who question: who has violated the Constitution?‖). 
 106. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 159 (2d ed. 1994) (―[T]hough ‗Treat like cases alike 
and different cases differently‘ is a central element in the idea of justice, it by itself is incomplete . . . 
until it is established what resemblance and differences are relevant.‖); see also id. at 155–67. 
 107.  This Note assumes without comment some necessary connection between principles of 
justice and principles of equality.  
 108. E.g., PASCAL BRUCKNER, THE TYRANNY OF GUILT 38 (Steven Rendall trans.,2010) (―It is the 
paradox of open societies that they seem to be disordered, unjust . . . whereas other, more oppressive 
societies seem harmonious . . . .‖). In Montesquieu‘s words: ―Where there are no visible conflicts, 
there is no freedom.‖ Id. But see CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, HITCH-22, at 51 (2010) (―The conventional 
word that is employed to describe tyranny is ‗systematic.‘ The true essence of a dictatorship is in fact 
not its regularity but its unpredictability and caprice; those who live under it must never be able to 
relax, must never be quite sure if they have followed the rules correctly or not.‖). 
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Even if we can agree upon a definition of equality, we must still decide 
what role socioeconomic rights play in its achievement. One approach 
would be to look at what the best off are getting and decide that everyone 
else should receive the same.
109
 A court need only announce that a 
socioeconomic right exists and define its content as the leveling up just 
described.
110
  
But just because we say that everyone holds equal rights does not mean 
that all citizens are equally capable of enjoying their exercise.
111
 Here, 
then, it is important to distinguish between unequal outcomes and 
inequality of opportunity.
112
 The former is an unavoidable result of 
individual differences and a market economy.
113
 The latter may result 
when the law forbids unequal treatment by burdening or benefiting 
identifiable groups, but ignores individuals who, through social 
subordination preserved by the law, cannot exercise basic civil and 
political rights.
114
 This is precisely the inequality that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment sought to correct.
115
 Proponents of the importance 
of ―substantive‖ equality contend that the very purpose of the 
 
 
 109. ELY, DISTRUST, supra note 98, at 24 (―[O]ne can guarantee equality either by thus 
commanding it, or, fairly well, by pointing to the things one considers important and saying everyone 
is to get them.‖). 
 110. Id. ―The Fourteenth Amendment takes both approaches, but the slightest attention to 
language will indicate that it is the Equal Protection Clause that follows the command of equality 
strategy, while the Privileges or Immunities Clause proceeds by purporting to extend to everyone a set 
of entitlements.‖ Id. 
 111. This recalls Anatole France‘s mockery of the law‘s ―majestic equality,‖ supra note 28, and 
suggests Rousseau‘s censure of politicians who ―fail to reflect that . . . the value [of liberty] is known 
only to those who possess [it].‖ JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, A DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY, AND A DISCOURSE ON 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 110–11 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 2006). 
 112. Indeed, statistical evidence shows that Americans care more about economic mobility than 
limiting stratification of wealth. See, e.g., Ron Haskins, Getting Ahead in America, 1 NAT‘L AFF. 36, 
42 (2008) (―Polls show that. . . . [w]hat matters is not how you compare to others, but whether you 
have a chance to improve your own circumstances.‖). That said, data indicates that father-son income 
correlations in the U.S. are higher than those in every other industrialized nation, implying that 
Americans enjoy less economic mobility than they might think. Id. at 44–45.  
 113. See HAYEK, supra note 104, at 87 (―From the fact that people are very different it follows 
that, if we treat them equally, the result must be inequality in their actual position . . . .‖). 
 114. See Wiles, supra note 62, at 48 (―Without being literate there is not much use for the right to 
freedom of speech, and without housing there is not much use for a right to privacy.‖). 
 115. AMAR & ADAMS, supra note 95, at 259, 268 (contending that the Fourteenth Amendment 
begins by affirming the rights, freedom, and citizenship of all and that, properly understood, it 
provides a ―dramatically new understanding of liberty‖). Not all commentators subscribe to such a 
dramatic interpretation. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 17 (―The purpose of the initial clause of the 14th 
Amendment was to put former slaves on par with all other citizens.‖); see also Richard A. Epstein, Of 
Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334, 335 (2005) (contending that, in the context of economic 
liberties, the Fourteenth Amendment embraces a narrow definition of liberty).  
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Reconstruction Amendment was transformative.
116
 It may be argued in 
favor of socioeconomic rights that traditional civil and political rights 
insufficiently promote equal liberty.
117
 The Court has made clear that 
liberty and equality are closely related: protecting civil liberties can 
promote equality for subordinated groups,
118
 and protecting personal 
autonomy can promote civil equality and affirm equal citizenship.
119
  
But the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses have already proven to be inadequate textual vehicles for the 
recognition of broad socioeconomic rights.
120
 The Due Process Clause 
applies, as its name suggests, primarily to process. It ―place[s] a federal 
check on how state laws are applied to particular persons.‖121 The Equal 
Protection Clause applies to inconsistent government treatment of like 
individuals. It ―impose[s] a duty on state executive branches to extend the 
protection of the law on all persons without discrimination.‖122 If the 
Fourteenth Amendment truly was transformative, then it seems logical that 
its leading clause
123
 best supports the recognition of new, judicially 
 
 
 116. See, e.g., Balkin & Siegel, supra note 17, at 93–95 (calling the amendment ―an act of 
redemptive constitutionalism . . . fulfill[ing] the greater purposes of the Constitution and the 
Declaration of Independence‖). Balkin and Siegel further contend that ―[w]hen the Court protected 
liberty during the Second Reconstruction, it paid attention to the inequalities of resources and roles 
that shaped ordinary people‘s daily lives and their encounters with the law.‖ Id. at 99.  
 117. When discussing ―equal liberty,‖ one must again be careful to distinguish equality of 
opportunity from equality of outcome; liberty and the latter are, in a sense, mutually exclusive. By 
desiring equality of result, one has interposed to substitute his or her judgment of the proper outcome 
upon what would otherwise be the result of individual choice (as unpredictable and messy as that 
might be). Courts do, however, use liberty interests to protect the exercise of individual rights. See 
infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text.  
 118. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (liberty interests make a sodomy statute 
unconstitutional despite no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sex). 
 119. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the negative right against the criminalization of 
abortion in some circumstances makes a statute that does so unconstitutional); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the fundamental right to be free of government invading marital 
privacy makes a statute criminalizing the use of contraceptives unconstitutional). 
 120. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (describing repeated failures to persuade 
federal judges to derive positive entitlements from existing constitutional text).  
 121. Randy E. Barnett, Is the Constitution Libertarian? 17 (Georgetown Pub. Law Research Paper 
No. 1432854, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1432854. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses apply 
to persons, whereas the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies to citizens. AMAR & ADAMS, supra 
note 95, at 195–218.  
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enforceable rights. Indeed, commentators of all political persuasions agree 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was written to protect substantive 
fundamental rights and, in the run-up to McDonald, urged restoration to its 
intended effect.
124
 Though it has long sat in the judicial scrap heap,
125
 and 
though Justice Alito danced around it in his plurality opinion for the Court 
in McDonald,
126
 the Clause remains the most suitable vehicle for judicial 
recognition of socioeconomic rights based on existing constitutional text. 
IV. PRACTICAL MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS 
A. Reinvigorated Privileges or Immunities as a Textual Vehicle 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make the 
fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights applicable against state 
governments.
127
 This included both enumerated rights and preexisting, 
unenumerated ―natural‖ rights.128 The Privileges or Immunities Clause was 
central to this purpose. ―Privileges and immunities‖ are synonymous with 
 
 
 124. E.g., Professors‘ Brief, supra note 12, at 4. Perhaps the strongest argument against restoration 
is from considerations of stare decisis. E.g., Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause to Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and the Federal 
Government, 326 CATO POL‘Y ANALYSIS 1, 38 (1998), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ 
pas/pa326.pdf; cf. Edelman, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that ―the Court has overruled longstanding 
doctrines on other occasions‖). Edelman directs this comment toward conservative scholars who hope 
for a return to Lochner-era property and contract rights, but he himself contends that ―the Roosevelt 
Court did not go far enough in assuring minimum economic protection for individual citizens.‖ Id. at 
1–2.  
 125. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (―The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause has been largely dormant since the Slaughter-House Cases restricted its coverage 
to ‗very limited rights of national citizenship.‘‖); Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 495 (3d ed. 2006) (―[T]he Supreme Court‘s extremely narrow interpretation 
of the privileges or immunities clause never has been expressly overruled and has precluded the use of 
that provision to apply to the Bill of Rights.‖).  
 126.  
―We see no need to reconsider . . . here. For many decades, the question of the rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement has been analyzed under 
the Due Process Clause of that Amendment and not under the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause. We therefore decline to disturb the Slaughter-House holding.‖  
McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3030–31 (2010).  
 127. See AMAR & ADAMS, supra note 95, at 196. Section 1 was also intended to overturn the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See supra note 123 for 
the relevant text of the amendment. Dissection of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s drafters‘ more specific 
intentions is the subject of considerable debate and is beyond the scope of this Note.  
 128. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (―The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.‖); see also Randy E. Barnett, The 
Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006) (affirming the existence of 
fundamental rights not explicitly listed in the text of the Constitution).  
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―rights and freedoms,‖129 and it was the abridgment of these core rights 
and freedoms at the hands of Southern legislatures that the Amendment‘s 
Framers sought to combat.
130
 
Unfortunately, the Court‘s first interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment dramatically reduced the scope of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, holding it to apply only to those rights purely 
associated with federal citizenship.
131
 As a result of this judicial misstep,
132
 
subsequent incorporation of fundamental rights against states proceeded 
through the Due Process Clause, even though its very terms, concern for 
process, render it textually inapposite for the recognition of substantive 
rights.
133
 Moreover, because due process is phrased as a negative right, it 
is particularly unsuited for harvesting positive socioeconomic rights.
134
  
The Privileges or Immunities Clause, on the other hand, affords a more 
suitable path. The text of the Clause plainly refers to unspecified 
substantive rights against government.
135
 Though the Court in McDonald 
used the Due Process Clause to protect a fundamental right from 
governmental intrusion,
136
 its result relied on the vote of a Justice whose 
 
 
 129. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 
1221 (1992) (citing MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 64–65 (1986)) (―[The] words rights, liberties, privileges, and 
immunities, seem to have been used interchangeably.‖). To be clear, though these terms correspond in 
the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is possible to make distinctions among them in other 
situations. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–58 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions] 
(classifying legal relations under two categories: jural correlatives and jural opposites). The relevance 
of Hohfeld‘s scheme to the instant discussion is discussed below.  
 130. AMAR & ADAMS, supra note 95, at 194, 199. 
 131. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).  
 132. See Shapiro & Blackman, supra note 17, at 16 (―Virtually no serious modern scholar—left, 
right, and center—thinks that [Slaughter-House] is a plausible reading of the [Fourteenth] 
Amendment.‖). 
 133. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Klukowski, Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporating the Second Amendment 
Through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. REV. 195, 203 (2009) (―Many of the 
problems related to incorporating federal rights against the states are due to the chaos that the judiciary 
has created with the Due Process Clause . . . .‖).  
 134. See Currie, supra note 27, at 865 (noting that the prohibition of states ―to ‗deprive‘ people of 
certain things . . . suggests aggressive state activity, not mere failure to help‖). This Note does not 
address the impact that a potentially revitalized Privileges or Immunities Clause would have on 
existing substantive due process doctrine. For one commentator‘s analysis, see Timothy Sandefur, 
Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due Process, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 115 (2010).  
 135. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 317 (2007); 
see also ELY, DISTRUST, supra note 98, at 25 (―[The Privileges or Immunities Clause] seems to 
announce rather plainly that there is a set of entitlements that no state is to take away (at least not from 
a United States citizen).‖). 
 136. At issue was the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, 
specifically the personal right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense. McDonald v. 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 (2010). Because it found this right to be ―among those fundamental 
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separate opinion rejected the plurality‘s textual means and depended on a 
logical interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
137
  
Thus, an interpretive door was opened.
138
 Future judges, consistent 
with McDonald and faithful to text and principle,
139
 might properly find 
other rights and liberties and hold them to apply against government. A 
court need not force the ―discovery‖ of a substantive right in the Due 
Process Clause. A litigant need only establish that the protection she seeks 
is a privilege or immunity of citizenship.  
The possibility of using a revitalized Privileges or Immunities Clause 
as a source for socioeconomic rights depends on the ability to locate these 
rights among the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. On its 
face, this is an easier task than attempting to shoehorn new individual 
rights into existing substantive due process doctrine. The range of 
preexisting unenumerated rights is surely broader than those ―of the very 
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty‖140 or those ―objectively, deeply 
rooted in this Nation‘s history and tradition.‖141  
The Court has given some guidance on what privileges and immunities 
are—most notably Justice Washington‘s laundry list in Corfield v. Coryell, 
written forty-five years before the Fourteenth Amendment.
142
 These 
privileges included ―the right to pursue and obtain happiness and safety‖ 
and other rights ―manifestly calculated . . . [to] better secure and 
perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people‖143—
guarantees that certainly seem broad enough to accommodate new 
substantive socioeconomic rights.
144
  
 
 
rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty,‖ the Court held that states, too, are bound by the 
protections afforded by the Second Amendment. Id. at 3042, 3050. 
 137. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (―I agree with 
that description of the right. But I cannot agree that it is enforceable against the States through a clause 
that speaks only to ‗process.‘ Instead, [it] . . . is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Privileges or Immunities Clause.‖).  
 138.  As one commentator explained: ―[T]he fact that there was only a plurality for using the Due 
Process Clause means that the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is now part of 
constitutional law.‖ Randy Barnett, The Supreme Court‟s Gun Showdown, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2010, 
at A19 [hereinafter Barnett, Showdown].  
 139. E.g., id. ―Justice Thomas‘s uncontradicted analysis will enter into the casebooks from which 
all law students and future justices study the 14th Amendment.‖ Id.  
 140. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 141. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–21 (1997). 
 142. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (1823). The Court in Coryfield was interpreting the meaning of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.  
 143. Id. at 552. 
 144. But see Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 
1979 WASH. L.Q. 695, 697 (―Although we do not know precisely what the phrase ‗privileges or 
immunities‘ meant to the framers, a variety of explanations exist for its open-endedness other than that 
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Indeed, recognizing socioeconomic rights through a restored Privileges 
or Immunities Clause arguably befits the ―radical reorientation of the 
American constitutional order‖ that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment intended.
145
 Given the chance to expand liberty for those 
unable to enjoy its full and constitutionally guaranteed exercise, it is 
plausible to foresee judicial sanction of a broad range of positive rights.
146
 
One possible argument may proceed as follows. A constitution is 
legitimate only if it balances principles of democracy (popular 
sovereignty, public autonomy) and principles of constitutionalism (rule of 
law, private autonomy).
147
 One becomes a full citizen not only by having 
constitutionally announced rights, but also by exercising them.
148
 There is 
a trend reflected in culture
149
 and present in all branches of government
150
 
toward rule in the hands of experts and elites. This runs counter to 
principles of democracy. The Privileges or Immunities Clause protects a 
baseline of rights associated with citizenship. Thus, recognition of 
socioeconomic rights via a revitalized Privileges or Immunities Clause 
may be justified where such rights increase participation in democratic 
constitutional institutions, which are threatened by accumulation of 
decision-making power in the hands of unelected experts.  
Hypothetical exercises aside, the constitutionalization of 
socioeconomic rights via federal courts faces considerable difficulty. 
America‘s cultural and political institutions remain classically liberal. The 
Supreme Court continues to show preference for measured, careful 
judgments.
151
 Legal rights must be clearly defined to have meaning;
152
 
 
 
the framers intended to delegate to courts the power to make up the privileges or immunities in the 
clause.‖). 
 145. See Epstein, supra note 17; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.14 (1982) (stating 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish ―class or caste treatment‖ for those 
―disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control‖).  
 146. One proposed path—post-reinvigorated Privileges or Immunities Clause—is for the Court to 
expand its First Amendment ―reasonable time, place and manner‖ doctrine and adopt a ―presumption-
of-liberty‖ standard of review when reviewing state actions that affect liberty interests. See Lawrence, 
supra note 96, at 150–60.  
 147. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.  
 148. Tully, Unfreedom, supra note 49, at 210–11.  
 149. See, e.g., William Voegeli, The Meaning of the Tea Party, X CLAREMONT REVIEW OF BOOKS 
12, 19 (2010) (―We‘ve delegated responsibility for our ―core institutions‖—public schools and 
colleges, health care, finance, retirement, government at all levels—to those experts, and all of them 
‗cost more than we can pay,‘ but ‗don‘t do what we need.‘‖). 
 150. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum & Neil Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares More About Elites, 
Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010). 
 151. That is not to say that Justices are consistent in the importance assigned to precedent in any 
given case. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
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ambiguities must be acknowledged and addressed to make good sense of 
the parties and issues at stake.
153
 But the Court, not Congress, is best 
positioned to identify what those rights are.
154
 In McDonald, the Court 
pressed to know what unenumerated rights constitute privileges or 
immunities such that a revitalization of the eponymous clause might lead 
to their vindication.
155
 Though the plurality‘s opinion left this question 
unanswered, the tracks have been laid to return to it in the future.
156
 There 
certainly exists mounting public acceptance of an increased role of 
government in citizens‘ lives.157 People are subject to a dizzying number 
of laws, whether they like it or not.
158
 Citizens certainly see value in 
government actions that address immediate problems.
159
 But just what 
 
 
(―Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.‖), with id. at 993 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(―Reason finds no refuge in this jurisprudence of confusion.‖). 
 152. See generally Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions, supra note 129. 
 153. This is an ongoing process, even with rights explicitly guaranteed. See generally Rosenkranz, 
Subjects, supra note 105. One difficulty with making good sense of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause is that it lacks an explicit subject. 
 154. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (―Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power ‗to enforce,‘ not the 
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be 
enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the ‗provisions of [the Fourteenth 
Amendment].‘‖).  
 155. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 
08-1521) (―Justice Ginsburg: . . . What does the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship 
embrace?‖); id. at 4 (―Justice Sotomayor: What [injustice]. . . has been caused by [not incorporating 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause] that we have to remedy . . . ?‖); id. at 63 (―Justice Kennedy: . . . 
[W]hat are these other unenumerated rights?‖).  
 156. See Barnett, Showdown, supra note 138 (―[T]here is no longer a majority of the court willing 
to use the Due Process Clause in a case in which the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the right clause 
on which to rest its decision.‖). 
 157. To give but a few recent examples of such intervention, direct and indirect: increased 
regulation of the practices of financial institutions, public stakes in banks and automakers, and 
expansion in the provision of health care. This is a trend in wealthy and developing alike. See, e.g., 
Picking Winners, Saving Losers; The Global Revival of Industrial Policy, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2010 
(ascribing this strategy in part to pressure on governments to reduce unemployment, stimulate growth, 
and rebalance economics). 
 158. See Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You‟re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE 
NAME OF JUSTICE 43–56 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009).  
 159. Polls show that a significant majority of Americans believe reducing unemployment to be a 
more important goal of the government than reducing the deficit. E.g., Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ. 
Polling Inst., U.S. Voters Split on Obama, Down on Everyone Else, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds; 
But President‘s Job Push Gets Strong Support (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/ 
x1295.xml?ReleaseID=1423 (reporting 71% belief in the above and 72% support for 100 billion dollar 
federal expenditure to create jobs). Given that unemployment surpassed 10% in 2009, these results are 
of little surprise. See generally Don Peck, How a New Jobless Era Will Transform America, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Mar. 2010, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/201003/jobless-america-
future. 
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kind of ―shepherd‖ we want remains to be seen.160 Government cannot 
guarantee jobs for everyone. Even if a constitutional ―right to gainful 
employment‖ exists, it‘s unclear what sort of employment that would 
be.
161
 Moreover, as legal rights of nonstate actors continue to expand
162
 
and transnational enterprises take greater responsibility for the observance 
of international norms in human rights,
163
 judicial oversight of the 
interaction among states, citizens, and multinational corporations seems 
increasingly necessary. The concerns underlying these views are precisely 
what positive socioeconomic rights are intended to address. Stay tuned.  
 Micah Zeller  
 
 
 160. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 805–06 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
Gerald Bevan trans., Penguin Classics 2003) (1835, 1840) (―[T]he ruling power . . . cover[s] the 
surface of social life with a network of petty, complicated, detailed, and uniform rules . . . . It does not 
break men‘s wills but it does soften, bend, and control them . . . reduc[ing] each nation to nothing 
more than a flock of timid and hardworking animals with the government as shepherd.‖).  
 161.  One large employment agency reports that finding skilled labor ranks first among American 
employers‘ hiring challenges and recommends a ―societal mindshift that brings honor back to‖ 
tradespeople like butchers, mechanics, and electricians. Manpower, Inc., Strategic Migration—A 
Short-Term Solution to the Skilled Trades Shortage, WORLD OF WORK INSIGHT, Aug. 2010, at 2–3, 
available at http://www.manpower.com/research/research.cfm (using data from its 2010 Talent 
Shortage Survey). 
 162. Corporations have long been afforded many core constitutional rights, the exercise of which 
the Supreme Court has recently strengthened. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010) (invalidating on First Amendment grounds a federal statute limiting corporate political 
expenditures).  
 163. See Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, S.C. Res. 2003/16, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2003/12 (Aug. 
26, 2003) (―Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure 
respect of and protect human rights.‖); Interview by Richard Dion with John Ruggie, Special 
Representative of the U.N. Sec‘y Gen. on Issues of Bus. & Human Rights (May 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.shell.com/home/content/responsible_energy/shell_ world_stories/2009/john_ruggie/ (―The 
state has the primary duty in relation to human rights, and for most social and economic rights its duty 
is subject to ‗progressive realisation‘. . . . [Business] ought to do its best to contribute to the realisation 
of rights.‖).  
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